MakerDAO risk control members tell: Why update the economic model

Yesterday, monetsupply.eth, a member of MakerDAO's risk control team, proposed MakerDAO's new economic model and governance plan, and explained the reasons for the revision on Twitter.

1- I just made a token economics and governance improvement proposal for MakerDAO, link here: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/stkmkr-maker-staking-and-tokenomics-revision/13890?u=monet -supply

2- MakerDAO is often criticized for its simple buyback and burn mechanism, and while I think buyback and burn has many benefits (very efficient in disposing of gas and taxes), it does have some things that prevent MakerDAO from reaching its full potential shortcoming:

3- The first is the lack of targeted incentives: the token economic model should incentivize positive behavior, but purchases and burns are treated equally to all token holders; the second is the lack of a new story: changes in the token economy may triggers a positive change in mood and leads to higher returns for participants;

4- The third point is limited deterrence against governance attacks: attackers can withdraw MRK immediately and mix with DeFi lending or AMM pools to limit the responsiveness of the DAO to burn tokens or execute other punitive measures.

5- Join stkMKR, a new token economic framework for MakerDAO. This proposal is largely based on Cosmos-style governance (which in my opinion is the gold standard of token economics), and also borrows from SushiSwap's xSUSHI and Aave's stkAAVE framework.

6- Voting and participating in governance requires locking MRK and generating stkMKR. If you want to exit, you must wait for a fixed waiting period (for example, 2-3 weeks).

7- The "waiting period" significantly improves the security of governance - malicious attackers cannot withdraw funds immediately and pollute the DeFi pool. In addition, this can also improve resilience to credit losses, as locked MKR cannot be sold immediately through the front-running protocol's ordering function.

8- A part of the repurchased MKR will be used as a reward for locked funds, and the reward will be automatically compounded like xSUSHI to maximize the gas efficiency and ensure that there will be no marginal gains due to the scale of stkMKR holdings.

9- Other changes include:

"Conditional delegation": The trustee can revise the voting decision of the trustee;

"Disaster Recovery": stkMKR can be permanently locked by governance against attacks, allowing attackers' shares to be destroyed with minimal disruption to DeFi.

10- By distributing a portion of the profits to users who lock MKR, MakerDAO will significantly increase the returns of active participants, which will help incentivize ordinary holders without the need for complex and risky long-term locking mechanisms (such as veTokens).